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I.  Introduction 
- .  .  '  .  . 
.  1..  The  co-operation  between  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Col!11Ilunity ·and  the' 
United States in the peaceful uses of  nuclear energy dates back to the late 1950's  . 
.  -It  was consolidated m  a bilateral agfeement that entered-into force in .1960 and 
will expire on 31  December 1995. A new cq-operation agreement to replace the. 
existing one has been negotiated on the basis of negotiating DireCtives proposed 
by the Corrup.ission and adopted by the  Cotincil on 16112fl991.- The ·successful 
conclusion ofthese_negotiations is the basis of  this Coll!Illunication to the Council 
with its e'xplanatory  memorand~. .  '  . 
. 2.  ·The co:.operation developed over the last 35 yeats tinder this agreement is valued 
as highly positive by ·both parties. For the European Union it has provided the 
framework to import from the US essential materials, equipment and technology 
that made it possible for the European nuclear- induStry to reach eventuaily a high · 
level  of· maturity.  For· the -United  'States, -peaceful ·nuclear  co-operation with 
Euratom provided a major and reliable nuclear trading partner With which tliere 
was~  since the beginning, a large degree of  agreement on nuclear non-proliferation 
issues Which opened the way to, tlie full  commitment to the multilateral nuclear-
:non-proliferation regime that both the E.U. and the U.S. share today._· 
3.  Both  parties  had  therefore -a  favourable · predisposition:  to  negotiate.  a  new 
cooperation agreement. The degree of interest was· however not the same, and as 
· · regards Euratom it wa5 greatly influenced by the adoption :by the U.S.  Con~ess . 
in,  1978  of ~h~ U.R .Nuclear Non-Proliferation,· Act  which  introquced  stricter 
requirements  :- including, some of a_  bilateral  nature  - for  U.S  .. peaceful  CO-:-
operatioli  With  other  countries.  While  Euratom and· the  U.S.  realised that the. 
· continuation Of their -bilateral co-operation in a field.as sensitive as nuClear energy·  · 
'was · politically· important,- both .  ·sides  started  the  negotiations  with  specific· 
priorities and not nece~sarily compatible agend_as .. :  · ..  - ·  · 
4.  For the U.S ..  Administration it was particularly important to  cozrlirm in a new. 
agreement the vested rights that  in its view result from the earlier nuclear exports 
to Europe as well as to cast the new agreen;tent Within the basic requirementS of 
present U.S. law.  The Commission, the Member States and ·the nuclear industry 
'  ~  .  -.  I  ,  .  -
of the CommunitY were reluctant to envisage conditions for cooperation that - in 
spite of the  formally .reciprocal  character of all  provisions  ~ .could in- practice 
introduce and expand in-an unpredictable manner consent rights on U,S.-obligated 
nuclear material present in the. K-U.  and thus jeopardize the  long ter:m· stability· 
that the  Corrnnunity ·nuClear  industry  needs  for  planning  and  carrying  out its 
activities . 
,  I 
,, 
'  ·.:. 5.- It was important for both sides to successfully conclude a cooperation agreement, 
ap.d also ~  far as possible, to reach agreement  ~thin a tiniefranie that a~oided 
a lapse of the present Agreement.  In the absence of an agreement, trade in US 
obligated materials with the  EU  both  directly  and via third colintries,  such as 
deliveries of  US-obligated spent fuel from Japan and Switzerland for reprocessing 
in the EU, would be halted: A lapse with no  agreement in prospect, because of 
-its  knock~ori effects for  third ·countries'  fuel  cycle choices, would be likely· to 
cause uncertainty and disruption in the international nuclear fuel market.  Over a 
lapse of many years, EU reprocessing and other fuel  cycle business worth up to 
1  0 bn ECU could be at stake, and a similar amount of potential business possibly 
lost by the US.  However,  a short lapse (for istance for the completion of US 
~ongressional approval procedures), while  not_without costs for EU industry-in 
rearranging business, would be unlikely to  inflict major damage on the industry 
EU dependency on US  Supplies  is decreasing, and most of the spent fuel from 
third countries is already inside the Union. It should be noted that in 1994, there 
was_ an average stock in the territory of the  European Union of 341  tonnes of 
plutonium. Some 31 o/o  of this is US obligated. 
II.  Summary of the negotiations 
6.  In view of the  expiration  of the  current  Euratom!U.S.  Nuclear  Co-operation 
Agreement  (signed  in  1960)  on  31.12. 9  5,  the  Commission  approved  a 
Communication  to  the  Council  for  negotiating  directiveson  23.7.91  and  the 
Council adopted these directives on 16.12.91.  The EU legal basis for negotiation 
was the Euratom Treaty and the U.S. basis its.domestic legislation- the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation  Act  of 1978  (NNP  A).  Negotiations  opened  in  199~. Good 
progress was  made  during  1992 -and  1993  in agreeing texts,  in particular,  on 
industrial and co_mmercial co-operation, nuclear research and development; nuclear 
safety  and  some  aspects  of safeguards,  non-proliferation  and  related  matters. 
However,  some  difficulties  were  caused_ by  U.S~ requirements to  insert in the 
Agreement certain conditions stemming largely from U.S. domestic  legislation~ 
, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNP  A). 
7.  Early  in  1994  a high level  demarche  was  ma,de  by  the  Commis'sion to  U.S. 
Secretary of State, Mr.  Warren Christopher.  The Commission advised the U.S. 
that a waiver was the best  solution to  these problems.  The U.S.  Secretary of 
State advised the Commission in June 1994 that the U.S. Government would-not 
be using. this waiver but committed the U.S.  side to  flexibility in its negotiating 
position.  Faced  with  this  situation,  Commission negotiators  strove  to  obtain 
equivalent mechanisms that would provide, in practice, the same kind of  long-term 
assurances  and  predictability  needed  for  the  E.U. ·nuclear  programmes  and 
international trade.  The General Affairs CounCil of 19/20 December 1994, while 
confirming the  December  1991  negotiating mandate,  asked the  Commission to 
continue to explore possible solutions.  Accordingly, the Commission negotiators 
_.  , explored,  in  depth,  a  solution  consisting  of improving  substantially  the  U~S. 
original offer of advance generic prior consent Ol}  a programmatic-basis. 
8.  The Commission considers that a draft agreement has been reached which fully 
meets the requirements of  the negotiating directives laid down by the Council and 
2 . which preserves E~atoiri's essential interests .  .:. Throughout all the  l~ngthy period 
of -the  negotiations,  which started in March 1992 and .involved .fifteen formal 
negotiating sesssions, the relevant Working Gtoup of  the Council (AQG) has been 
associated in an unprecedented way withall steps and developments. ID.I!umerable  · · 
meetings of the AQG,_ supplemented by frequent ad .hoc 'information meetings. in· 
the Commission's premises, have permitted the Commission to provide to Me11:1ber . 
States prompt,  in-d~pth and exhaustive infonnation, to examine thoroughly with 
them each issue at stake, and to receive from them an input that the Comlnission 
has highly  valued  and  that has  contributed sigilificantly to  the  ad-referendum 
agreement which was fmall:y  reached.with the us·. 
9.  Given the extended negotiation period and the long procedures necessary for the 
approval of theAgreement by the. Council of Ministers and the US Congiess (  6-9. 
. months), there has been an interest on both sides to conclude the Agreement as _ 
soon as possible, so that the undes.irable lapse·· of Agreement at the end of 1995_. 
··cari be avoided. The strong economic interest of  EU industry is for there to be no  · 
gap between the expiry of  the current agreement and the entry into force of  a new  -
,agreement.  ·  ·  · 
III.  The results_ of the negotiations . 
10.  A primary objective of  the negotiations was:to agree on a legal framework which 
would guarantee to European nuclear industry, whenever it operates with U.S.- · 
obligated mateiials, security of  supply, stability and long-term prediCtability. The · 
Commission considers that these  objectives· have- been  attained,  since the new . 
. agreement, which will remain in force for at least 30 years,-followed possibly by 
subs.equent 5-year roll-over. periods, guarantees the following framework as long· 
as it remains· in force :  ·  ·  · 
any non-sensitive nuclear activities,  as  well as  enrichm~nt up to 20  %~ 
irradiation of fissile materials,_ and post-"irradiation examination. involving 
chemical· dissolution or separation o{  irradiated nuclear· material· will be · 
freely and unconditionally allowed;  . 
.  .  .  .  ' 
retrailsfers to third countries will take place according to procedures. set 
outin the agreed minute;· ·  _  ·  . 
.  .  ' 
. storage of sensitive fissile material will  be  possible  in any facility that 
meets the usuaL physical protection levels; 
reprocessing and alteration in form or content of sensitive fissile ~paterials 
Will take place under a generic prograrnrriatic consent, in facilities 'forming · 
·part of the  peaceful programme delineated by each Party;  such generic-
. consent  will,  in  .  normal  circumstances, .. be  defacto  irrevocable,  and  . 
there{ore valid in_ practice for the entire life of the agreement. 
11.  Against this general backgro'und, a number of specific difficult issues have been· 
successfully ·resolved·as follows:- · 
12~ .  One of  the major issues of particular concern to E.U. industry was the  U~S. claim 
for extension of·U.S. obligations to  non-U.S.  items as  a result of certain basic 
3 industrial operations, e.g.  in power reactors for generating electricity. The U.S. 
side finally conceded that there would be no  practical change in the status quo 
(under the current Euratom!U.S. Agreement) in these areas .. 
·13.  - Another_ special problem was the applicability of  national legislation to operations 
within the scope of this Agreement;  in particular the E.U. could not accept that 
a change in the U.S. NNPA, which Congress could make at any time, ·could lead. 
to U.S. action amounting  to' a determination to change the terms'of co-operation. 
·In spite of  U.S. strong resistarice th~ Con1mission has secured an Article to protect 
the E.U. position in this connection (Article 13). 
14.  As regards exchanges of technology ·and certain components a side:-letter to the 
. proposed Agreement includes terms which are in E. U.  interests. 
15.  In the area of nuclear safeguards, the text of the proposed Agreement confmns 
that if, for any reason, I.A.E.A. (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards 
were not being applied in the Community then co-operation could continue fully 
under Euratom safeguards only.  This is a useful guarantee and also a  further  . 
recognition of the non-proliferation credentials of the Co~unity. 
16.  Furthermore, the U.S. had declined up to now to terminate its separate bilateral 
nuclear agreements with Portugal,  Spain,  Austria,  Finland and Sweden still in 
force.  Such termination was however a political priority for the Commission. It-
has now been ensured that' these agreements  will be terininated _on  favourable 
terms and that future relevant co-operation will take place under the proposed new 
Agreement on more·favourable terms for the EO than under these Member States' 
existing agreements with the U.S.  .., 
17. ·  Further issues- to which attention should be ~aWn  are: 
a)  Alteration in form or content of certain strategic material 
The scope  of such alterations  is  limited.  In particular,  processing and 
production operations  by  E.U.  industry  for  overseas 'customers  (where 
original U.S. supplies- are involved) Will continue without hindrance.· 
b)  Storage of certain strategic material 
The  Commission has  ensured  that  storage  no  longer falls  - under  the 
programmatic  prior  consent  mechanism;  only physical protection  and 
security aspects are relevant.  These Will  pose no problems for  Member 
States. 
c)  Indefinite duration of consent rights  (i.e.  in the event the Agreement is 
_terminated or suspended - Article 14)  - · 
The Commi~sionhas  not accepted wide U.S. claims for indefinite-duration 
of consent rights on the existing very large inventory of material already 
transferred under the current agreement. The regime that would continue 
to apply would be that of the current Agreement but including
1 permanent 
retransfer consent. Duration  ofconsents relating to certain key fuel cycle 
activities involving U.S. supplied matyrial  und~r the new Agreement wi~l 
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. be discussed' by the Parties whenever the. Agreement will terminate I  and, 
in ca5e  of disagreement,  Will  be  deferred to  the decision of an arbitral 
Tribunal.  The result cannot  be .  forecast  at this  stage~ but achieving  a 
mutually agreed framework for later consultations on the extent of  duration 
of  consent rights  has been a key element in reaching Jgreement ori a fmal · 
'text. 
Suspension of programmatic consent rights 
(i)  the  prog~ammatic consent rights may only be' ~mspended if, after 
full  consultations,  there  is  objective  evidence. to  show that  the 
Union has  comri1itted  a  fundamental  breach of the  international 
non-proliferation  regime  or .  unless  the  safeguarding or physical 
·  protectio~ of the installation concerned. are seriously and directly 
threatened. Given the non-proliferation: commitln.ents of Member· 
States of the European Union and their powers in this context to 
.  ·enforce due application of  safeguards ·and physical protection, this 
means that the rights can be considered as de facto non-revocable; 
(ii) .  ev:en in the extremely unlikely eyent of such a suspension  of the 
consent rights, the Union retains all the rights existing under the 
current Euratom!U.S  ..  Agreement on a quantity of US- ohligated ·' 
nuclear material equiv~ent to that on the inventory at the time of 
· the entry. into force of the new Agreement. 
The many other Important operations in the nuclear fuel cycle,- e.g. enrichment of 
material and production of electricity, continue on the sarrie.basis as afpresent. 
e) 
f) 
Automatic retransfer consent 
For a  wide  range  of exports  of nuclear  material  the  Com:mission has 
obtained what, is, in practice, an irrevocable advance consent for exports 
(where  U.S.  obligated  materials  are  involved)  to  proce.ed  to  those 
countries  which,  as  a  mitiimum;  in~et  .  non-proliferation requirements 
acceptable to the Corrimurtity.  This is a major improvement on the current 
regime (case-by-case U.S. prior consent) and brings consider~ble long-term · 
security to the E.U.'s international nuclear tra,de. 
· International obligation. exchanges 
The Community has obtained agreement to the prfu.ciple ofsuch exchanges 
which allow, where feasible, b.ook transfers of  material internationally thus 
avoiding  the  considerable  costs  of.  physical transfers  as  well  as  the 
attendant need for safety and security measures dUfing such transport. 
l  . 
'I 
After 30 years, but with automatic 5-year roll-over periods ... 
5 g)  Special arrangements with Japan and Switzerland 
The advantageous retransfer provisions set out in the Exchange of Notes 
dated 18  July 1988 between the Commission and the United States have  . 
been further improved in that these provisions remain in effect for the life 
of this  new  Agreement  and  may· qnly  be  suspended  under· the  same 
conditions as those applying to the Agreement.  The provisions now also 
extend to  mixed oxide nuclear fuel.  In a note attached to the proposed 
Agreement the United States makes the political commitments that .it will 
·apply such an arrangement to imports from andre-exports to Switzerland,  . 
provided a U.S./Switzerland nuclear agreement continues to exist.  These 
arrangements are of  particular value to the Union's reprocessing and mixed 
oxide fuel  fabrication operations which involve a substantial number of 
jobs  and generate large export revenue. 
h)  Commercial guarantees 
Articles 3 and 4 provide for  appropriate industrial and commercial co-
operation, better procedures of  handling licences for exports and the fullest 
possible exchange  of'  equipment,  material  and  information.  The text of 
Article 10 of  the Agreement comprises a comprehensive set of  commercial 
guarantees  of non-interference  by  the  U.S.  in  the  Union's  domestic 
operations and international trade (and vice versa).  These are essential to 
the Union's nuclear industry, especially since a significant quantity ofUS-
obligated material is already inside the EU.  Paragraph 11  of the Agreed 
Minute C further states that the consents embodied in the Agreement may 
not  be  suspended owing  to  differences  over the  nature  of the  Parties' 
peaceful nuclear programmes or fuel  cy~le choices,  or for  purposes of 
obtaining commercial advantage, or of delaying, hampering or hindering 
the  peaceful  nuclear  programmes  or  activities  .in  the  Community, .  the 
Member States of the Community or the United States, or their peaceful 
. nuclear co-operation with third countries.  ,This  is the first time that the 
U.S. has even given such extensive and important guarantees to a trading 
partner. 
IV.  Final overall Assessment 
18.  The  political  and  commercial  importarlce  of the  Agreement  should  not  be 
underestimated. The positive results can be summarised as follows:-
a)  The nuclear energy aspects 
As  an 'important energy  source for  the  Union (35% of all  electricity  is 
nuclear produced),  it  was· necessary to ensure that  industrial and trade 
aspects  relating  in  particular  to  security  of  nuclear  supply  and 
competitivity  were  secured  by  the  Agreement.  This  Memorandum 
demonstrates that,  both within the Union and internationally, significant 
advantages have been obtained in this respeqt.  Although the E. U.  is no 
longer dependent on the U.S. in the nuclear sector, the Agreement forms 
a  secure  and  favoUrable  basis  for  considerable  co-operation  and  trade 
between the E.U. and U.S. nuclear industries as well as a number of third 
countries, and provides a durable framework for this trade to expand in the 
future according to the commercial choices and needs of the E. U. nuclear 
6 ·h) 
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. industry: It  also responds ~ffectively to the objectives of the Commission's 
recent Energy Green paper.  . 
Bilateral EC/US aspects· 
The differences  of views, .finally  resolved,  con~eriling -U.S.  clirims  for 
··consent rights should not overshadow the overall picture.  The Union and · 
the United States are the two major players in this peac'eiuJ use ·of nuclear 
energy.  (Japan's position is of  course also significant). The U.S. voiced 
· the view that it  would be inconceivable not to have an Agreemen.t for Co,. · 
·operation  between  the ·U,S.  and  the  Union.  . This· new Agreement 
constitutes a strong expression of the political and economic value. of the 
partnership that exists between the U.S. and the Union reaffirmed in· the 
Joint Declaration on E.C./U.S. relations ofNbvember 1990.  There is also 
.  .  ' 
no doubt thai certain key third countries such as Japan will also welcome 
this Agreement as ~ringing stability to nuclear co-operation and trading in 
the industrialised world.  · 
Internation-al Non-Proliferation aspects 
The  Emopean· Union,  its  Member .  State's. and  the  United  States  have 
indisputable non-proliferation credentiais.  These forril a key basis of  the 
co-operation~ · ·Any  form  of co-:operation  under  the Agreement .  is . for 
peace~ USe  ·Otlly.  Article  11  records  that  all  material  is  subjeCt  to. 
international  'instruments  dealing  With  their'  physical  protection  and 
security.  In'  addition s8fety aspects ru;e. covered.  The Agreement ensures 
that  internationally .  accepted  le~els  .·of non,-proliferation  and  physical' 
protection  apply  indefmit~ly  to  all  material  and  set~  an  appropriate 
example for oth~r countries. · 
19.,  . It should  be .noted  th~t this .reciproc~; Agreement  must,  of course,  also  be 
approved by _the U.S. Con~ess.  · 
V..  Conclusion 
20.  · In conclusion,  the Coriunission .  considers  that the benefits and the satisfactory 
·provisions .obtained  constitute· an Agreement  which  can  suitably  replace  the· 
curtep.t ·Nuclear Ag:r:eement  that. expires at the end of 1995.  The Commission 
considers that  the proposed new Agreement for Nuclear Co-operation between the · 
European Atomic· Energy Community and the United States: 
.  .  : 
.. complies  in  all .  respects .  with  the  negotiating, directives  issued by. the 
Council on t'6.12J99f;  '  · 
guarantees to the European nuclear industries the stapility, the long-term 
predictability and all the assurances that they .need; 
.  . 
· will provide a significant contribution to  strengthening the  E.U./U.S.A. 
overall relationship. 
21.  The Comri:rission therefore. invites the Council to approve the De'cision set out in 
the Annex.  ·  · 
7 Draft 
Council Decision approving the conclusion by the 
Commi~ion of an Agreement for peaceful nuclear co-operation 
between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and the Government of the United States of America 
/ 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the EuropeanAtomic Energy Community, and 
in particular the second paragraph of Article  101  thereof,. 
Having regar9 to the draft decision presented by the Commission, 
WHEREAS the Commission has carried out negotiations in accordance with Council 
directives,  adopted  by  Council  Decision of 16.-12.1991,  for  an  Agreement  between  the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and·the Government of  the United States of · 
America,  · 
.  ' 
WHEREAS the conclusion by the Commission of  that Agreement should be approved, 
HAS  DECIDED AS FOLLOWS 
Sole Article 
The  conclusion  by  the  Commission of an  Agreement  for .i peaceful  nuclear  co-operation 
between the European Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of  the United States 
is hereby approved..  · 
The text  of the Agreement is attached to this Decision. 
Done in Brussels ............................. . 
For· the Council,  . , 
The President • I  ~  I  . 
:.  ; .. · 
AGREE,MENT FOR  CO-OPERATION IN  THE PEACEFUL USES 
OF 'NUCLEAR ENERGY BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC EN:f:RGY 
COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  · 
THE EUROPEAN ·ATOMIC-ENERGY cow..ruNrtv, HEREINAFTER REFE~o  To· 
AS  "THE CO:t\.1MuNITY';·, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS "THE uNITED STA  TES.OF AMERICA";. 
·PREAMBLE 
·Whereas the Community and· the United States of America concluded an  Ag~eement whicH 
centered into force on 27 August 1958. and an Additional Agreement for Co-:operation·which· 
.entered  .. into force on '25 Juiy i 960, as subsequently amended, which expire on 31 December 
··.1995;  '  '  '  ' 
'  '  . 
Whereas the Community and the United States of Am'erica recognise the value of: their past 
co-operation  in the peaceful  uses of nuclear energy anp  wish to  provjde for  ren~wed'  co  .. 
. operation on 'the basis 
1of equality;  mutual benefit, reciprocityand. without prejudice to the · 
respec~ve powers of,each  ~arty;·  ·  · 
Whereas  the  Community  and  the  United  States  of  Amenca  are  convinced  that .  by 
strengthening arid  expanding their. partnership on an  equal· fo()ting they  will  contribute to 
continued international stabi,lity ·as well. as to political  and economic ,progress; 
Whereas the Community, its Member .States and the United States of America ,have  attaine~t · 
· a comparable ·advanced l(fvel. in ·the use of nuclear energy for ·electricity ·production; .in Jhe.· 
development of their nuclear industries and in the security afforded by their  respective laws 
and  regulations  concerning  health,  safety, ·the  peaceful  use. of nuclear· energy  and  the 
protection o(the environment; 
'  ' 
Whereas  it  is  necessary  to  establish  the .conditions  governing  transfers  of  n~clear  item~ 
between the Community and the United  St<i.tes  of America, to ensure  ~ontinued compliance 
'with the requirement for  free 'movement <of stich  items within th.e  Community and  to avoid  . 
interference  in. nuclear  programmes  in  place  in  the Community  and  the  Unite;d  States  of· . 
America  as well' as  in  their international  trading relations;  . 
Whereas all  Member States of the Community and  the United States of America are Parties 
to the Treaty  on  the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  hereinafter referred to as  "the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty";  .. Whereas the Commu.nity, its Member States, and 'the United States of America are committed 
to ensuring that  the research, development and  use of nuclear energy for peaceful purPoses 
are carried out in  a .manner consistent with the objectives of that  Treaty~ 
Whereas nuclear safeguards are applied  i~ the Community pursuant to the. Treaty establishing 
the European Atomic Energy  Community~  · 
·Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America reaffirm their 
· support of the International  Atomic Energy Agericy,  hereinafter referred to as  "the IAEA", 
· and of its safeguards system;  ·  · 
· Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America are strongly 
committed to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation and related safeguards 
regimes;. 
Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America are strongly 
committed  to  adequate  physical  protection  of nuclear  material  and  are  Parties  to  the 
International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; 
Whereas , it  is  desirable  to· facilitate,  as  appropriate,  trade,  exchanges  and  co-operation 
activities at an industrial and commercial scale, including peaceful international co-operation 
with third Parties, in accordance with  Article IV 'of the 1-fon~Proliferation Treaty; 
.Whereas it  is  also  desirable  to  set up  a framework  for. exchanges of information  and  for 
·consultations between the Parties on nuclear matters of common interest;  · 
Whereas co-operation should extend to nuclear research and development on nuclear safety 
and to regulatory and operational aspects of  radiological protection;. 
Whereas co-operation relating to nuclear fission research and development in such fields as 
safety, radiological-protection, health and the environment, and safeguards may be subject to 
specific agreements between the Community and the United States of  Americ~~ 
Whereas the Co~munity and  the. United States of America contribute to  international  co-
operation in  the field  of controlled thermonuclear fusion and,  in  particular, to the activities 
of the international thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER); 
Whereas it is appropriate that the nuclear co-operation Agreements concluded between, on the 
one hand, the United States of America and,  on the other hand, the Republic of Austria, the 
· Kingdom of Spain, the Portuguese Republic,  the Kingdom of Sweden and the Republic of 
, Finland before their accession to the European Community be terminated upon the entry into 
force of the present Agreement; 
Whereas 'likewise the  United  States  of America  is  prepared  to  terminate any  nuclear  co-
operation agreement it may have with third states acceding to the Community, 
HAVE AGREED AS  FOLLOWS: Article 1 
SCOPE OF CO-OPERATION 
1.  ,  The Parties may co-operate in  the peaceful  uses of nuclear energy in  the following 
areas:· 
A)  Nuclear fission  research  and  development on  su~h terms as  ~ay be agreed 
between the Parties; 
B)  .  Nuclear s~f~ty matters of mutual. inte,rest and competence, as set. ou~ in Artide 
2; 
C)  Facilitation  of  exchange ·and  co-operation. activttles  at  an  industrial  .or 
commercial scale'. between persons and undertakings; 
,D)  Subject to the provisions of  this Agreement, .supply between the Parties of  non-
nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment and provision of nuclear fuel 
cycle services, whether for use by or for· the benefit of the Parties or third 
countries; 
E) 
F) 
G) 
Exchange of information on  major international· questions related to  nucl~ar 
energy, such as promotion of. development in the -field of  international nuclear 
·  safeguar:ds  . and  non-proliferation  within· ·areas.  of  ·mutu~  interest.  and 
· competence, including collaboration with the IAEA on safeguards matters_and 
on. the interaction betw,een' nuclear energy and the environment;  . 
Controlled thermonuclear fusion including multilateral projects; . 
.  .  '  . 
Other areas of mutual interest. 
2.  ·  The co-operation referred to in this Article, as between the Parties; rriay also take place 
between persons ~nd undertakings established in the respective territories of the Parties. · 
Article 2 
CO-OPERATION-ON NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT  , 
I.  The.  Parties  may  co-operate  in  nuclear  research  and  development  including  the 
following  activities,  in  so  far as they  are  covered  by the respective nuclear research  and 
development programmes of the Parties:  ·  · 
. ·a.  nuclear safety,  including  regulatory  and  operational  aspects  of radiological 
protection; 
\  . 
b.  development of  nuclear energy including, inter alia, research into new reactors, 
decommissioning  of  ~uclear installations,  radiological  safety  research  into waste management and  disposal  and interaction between nuclear energy and 
the environment;  ·  · 
c.  nuclear safeguards; 
d.  research  on  controlled  thermonuclear  fusion  including, inter -alia,  bilateral 
activities  and  contributions  towards  multilateral  projects  such  as  the 
International· Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor {ITER). 
' 
2.  Co-operation  pursuant  to  this  Article may  include,  but is  not limited  to,  training, 
exchange  of personnel,  meetings,  exchanges  of samples,  materials  and  instruments  for 
experimental purposes and  a b~anced participation in joint studies and projects. 
· 3.  Information arising from  the implementation of this article which,  in the judgement 
of the appropriate authorities of the Parties, should be placed in the public domain may  be 
so disseminated by them in a consolidated or  other appropriate form, subject to the· Guidelines 
set out in Annex B. 
Article 3 
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CO-OPERATION 
In conformity with the prbvisions bf Aiti~Ie IV 9f the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Parties 
undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of  equipment, materials and scientific and· 
technological  inform~tion for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ·  ..  To this end, the Parties 
will  facilitate,  as  appropriate,  commercial · relations  between  persons  and  undertakings 
involving nuclear co-operation. 
Such co.,operation may include, but is not limited to: 
investments; 
joint ventures;  , 
environmental aspects at industrial or commercial scale; 
trade in nuclear items, non-nuclear material and technical and specialised services as 
specified in  Article 4;  · 
licensing arrangements between  persons and  undertakings in  the territory  of either 
Party.  ·  . {3) 
{ .. 
A<rticle 4 
'  ' 
NUCLEAR TRADE. 
I.  The Parties 'sh8:11  facilitate .nuclear trade between  theni~elveS,: in  the  mutual  interestS  t 
.  of,i~dustry,utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade betWeen,third countries 
and either Party of  items obligated to the other Party.  · 
,  ,  '  ,  \  .  '  ~I 
2. ·  ·  Authorisatio.ns,  including  export  and  import licences  as  well ·as  authorisations  or 
consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations.or nuclear material movements 
on the territories ~f  the J>arties shall not be used .·to restrict trade. The relevant authority shall 
act upon applications for such authorisations as soon as possible after submission and without  . 
unreasonable  expense.  Appropriate  administrative  procedures shall  be in  place  to  ensure; 
·respect of this provision.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
Article 5 
ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT 
·1.  Non- nuclear material,. nuclear material and equipment transferred be~een the 'Parties  or~· 
·  thei~ respective persons or undertakings,  whether directly  or through a third country, .shall  · 
become subject to this  Agreement upon  their entry  into the territorial juqsdiction of th~ 
receiving Party, provided that the supplying Party has.notified the receiving Party in Writing 
of the intended transfer and· the receiving Party has acknowledged in Writing the receipt of · 
this notification.  .  .  .  /  '  .  . ... 
.  2.  Non-nuClear  roateril,il.  nuclear material  and  equipment  referred  to in  this  Article  shall. 
remain subject to theprovisions of this Agreement until it has been determine~. inaccordance 
with the procedures set otit in the Administrative Arrarigeft1ent:  ·  ·  ·  . · 
that such items have been retransferred beyond the jurisdiction of the receiving PMty~  . 
that nucleaf material  or non-nuClear  material  are no longer usable for.  any  nuclear  . · 
activity relevant from the point of view of international  safeguards or have ·become · 
practically irrecoverable;  . .  · 
.·or that  ~quipmerit'is no 'longer usable. for imclear ·purposes  .. 
Article 6: 
SAFEGUARDS 
L.  . Safeguards required under this Agre·ement shall be those applied by  the Community 
pursuant to the  Euratqm  Treaty  and  by· the 'IAEA  pursuant  tp  the  following  safegiJards 
.. agreements, as relevant; as they may be revised and replaced so iong as coverage as required 
·by the Non-.ProliferationoTreaty isprovided for:  · (a) 
. (b) 
(c) 
(d) 
.  .  '·  '  \ 
the agreement between the Community, its non-nuclear weapon Member S~ates 
and the IAEA., which entered into force on 21.2.1977.;  · 
the agreement between the Community, the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain 
and Northern Ireland and  the IAEA., which entered into force on' 14.08.78; 
the agreement between the Community, France and the IAEA, which entered 
into force on  12.9.1981; 
the agreement between the United  States of America and  the IAEA, which · 
entered into force on 9  .12.1980;  · 
2.  .  (A)  Nuclear material transferred to the Community pursuant to this Agreement, and 
special fissionable material  used in or produced through the use of any  non-
nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment, so transferred, shall be subject 
to the relevant agreements rpferred·to _in  paragraph 1 of this Article. 
(B)  Nuclear material transferred to the United States pursuant to this Agreement, 
and special  fissionable material used in or ·produced through the use of any 
non~nuclear material,  nuclear material or equipment, so transferred, shall  be 
subject to the agreement referred to in paragraph 1(d) of this Article. 
3.  In the event that  any of the IAEA safeguards agreements referred to in  paragraph 
1(a); (b) or (c)  are not being applied,  · 
(a)  the Community shall enter into an agreement or agreements with the IAEA for 
the application of safeguards which. provide for effectiveness and coverage equivalent 
to that provided by the safeguards agreements required by paragraphs 1  (a), (b) and (c) 
or, if that is not possible, 
.  .  . . 
(b)·  the  Com'munity  shall  give  the  United  States of America  an  assu~ance that 
safeguards are being applied by the Community which provide for effectiveness and 
coverage  equivalent  to  that  provided  by. the  safeguards  agreements  required  by 
paragraph  l(a),, (b)  and  (c).  In  the  fulfillment  of obligations  arising from  these 
paragraphs,  the  United  States  of America  hereby recognizes  the  unique  role  and 
.importance of  the Euratom safeguards system and of  its application in the Community 
pursuant to the Euratom Treaty.  In this context, the United States of America further 
takes note that the IAEA,  pursuant to the safeguards agreements concluded with the 
Community  and  its  Member  States  as  well  as  in  subsequent  implementing . 
arrangements  shall  take  due  account, ··inter  alia,  of  the  effe~tiveness  of  the 
Community's system of safeguards enabling the IAEA to deploy an inspection effort 
less  than  that  applied  under  other.  safeguards  agreements  in  which  there  are 
comparable  nuclear  facilities  producing,  processing,  using  or  storing  safeguarded 
nuclear material where a regional  safeguards system ·does not exist. 
(c)  In  the  event that  conditions  arise  which  do  not  permit  application  of such 
safeguards  by  the  Community,  the  Parties  shall  immediately  establish  safeguards 
arrangements for  the  application  of safeguards which  provide for  effectiveness and coverage  equivalent  to  that  provided  by  the  safeguards  agreements  require4.  }?y 
paragraphs 1 (a),  (b) and  (c) of this Article .. 
4.  In the event that the)AEA. safeguards Agreement referred to in paragraph I(  d) of  this 
Article,. is not being apJ?lied,.  · 
(a) 
(b) 
.  \ 
the United States of America shall enter into an agreement or agreements with 
the IAEA for the application of  safeguards which provide for effectiveness and 
coverage equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreement .required by 
paragraph l(d) ofthis Article; or, ifthat is riot possible,  :  · 
·' 
the  Parties . shall  immediately  establish  safeguards  arrangements  for  the 
application  of  safeguards  which  provide  for  effectiveness  and.  'coverage 
equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreement required by paragraph 
l{d) of this Article.  ·  ·  ·  · 
·.  Article 7 
PEACEFUL USE 
1.  Co-operation· under this Agreement shall .be carried out for peaceful purposes. 
2.  Non-nuclear material,  nuclear  material  and. equipment transferred pursuant to this. 
Agreement and special fissionable material used in .or pro<luced through the use of  such items 
•  shall  not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any 
nuclear explosive device or for· any military purpose.  · · 
Article 8· · 
,NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES 
·1,  ·  The nucle·ar fuel  cycle activities carried  o~t pursuant to  this Agreement include : 
(A}  Within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of either  Party,  enrichment up  to :twenty· 
percent in the isotope 235, of  uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreemen~ as well 
as .  of .uranium .used  in  or  produced  through  the use  of equipment  so transferred  .. 
Enrichment of such  uranium  to  more  than  twenty  percent  in  the  isotope  235 ·and 
·  reenrichment ·of  such uranium  already enriched  to  more than twenty  percent in  the 
isotope 235may be carried out according to conditions ·agreed upon in writing which 
shall be the subject of consultations between the Parties within 40 days of the receipt 
of a request from  either Party.  " 
(B)  .  Irradiation  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of either  Party· of plutonium, 
uranium~233,  high  enriched  uranium  and irradiated  nuclear  material  transferred 
pursuant to this Agreement or used in  or produced  through  the use of non~nuclear 
material; nuclear material or equipment so transferred; : (C)  Retransfer to thira countries  according to procedures set out in  the  Agr.eed 
Minute of:  · 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
low enriched uranium,  non-nuclear material,  equipment and  source material 
transferred pursuant to this Agreement or of low enriched uranium produced 
through the use of nuclear material or equipment transferred pursuant to this 
Agreement, -for nuclear fuel cycle activities other than the production ofliEU; 
i'rradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated 
nuclear material used in' or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, 
nuclear  material  or equipment transferred  pursuant  to this  Agreement,  for 
storage. or disposal not· involving· repr?cessing; 
other nuclear material transferreq pursuant to this Agreement an~ other special 
fissionable material produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear 
material  or equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, for other fuel 
cycle activities including those specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of  this Article. 
{I))  Post-irradiation examination involving chemical  dissolution or separation of 
irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear 
material used in or produced through the use of  nqn-nuclear material, nuclear material 
or equipment so transferred.  · 
2.  The  following  nuclear  fuel  cycle  actlvttles  may  be  carried  out  pursuant  to  this 
Agreement within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party in facilities forming part 
of  the delineated peaceful nuclear programs described in Annex A:  .  f 
A)  Reprocessing of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and 
nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear 
. material or equipr:nent so transferred; 
· B)  Alteration in forin  or content of plutonium, uranium 233  and high enriched 
. uranium  transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the 
use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred; 
.  .  .  .  I 
3.  The following nuclear materials: 
(i)  pltUonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium, if not contained in irradiated · 
nuclear fuel,  transferred pursuant to this Agreement; 
(ii) ·plutonium,  uranium-233  and  high  enriched  uramum  recovered  from  nuclear 
material transferred pursuant to this' Agreement; 
'(iii)  plutonium,  uranium-233  and  high  enriched  uranium  recovered  from  nuclear 
. material  used in  equipment transferred pursuant to .this Agreement 
may be stored in facilities that are at ·all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of 
physical protection that are set out in Annex·C to IAEA document INFCIRC 254/Rev .. / 
'  .  ' 
1/Part 1 (Guidelines for nuclear transfers) as  it may  be revised and accepted by  the 
Parties and the Member States of the Community.  ·  ·  · 
,. 
Each Party  shall  record  its  fa~ilities on a list,  made available to the other Party.  A 
Party's list  shall be held confidential. if that 'Party so  requests~ Either Party may make 
changes to its  list by· notifying the other Party  in  writing_.and  receiving a written 
acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after 
the receipt of the notification and shaH  be limited to  a statement that th.e  notification 
has been received.  · 
If there are grounds to believe that the provisions ofthis sub-Aiticle are not being 
fully  complied with, .immediate consultations in accordance with the· provisions of 
Article 12.2 ·of this Agreement may be called for. 
The Parties  shall  ensure by means  ~f such  consultations that necessary  corrective 
measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be·sufficient torestore the levels 
of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. If this proves not 
· to be feasible,  the  nuclear material  in ·question  shall  be  transferred  for  storage  at  · 
another appropriate, listed facility. 
Article9 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS EXCHANGES 
~·  .. 
.  ' 
The Parties shall establish expeditious procedures to be ·applied when nuclear material is to 
be made  subject to this Agreement or removed from the coverage of this Agreemept.  These. 
procedures shall include provisions on international· exchanges of obligations, whicp will be 
set out in the Administrative Arrangement, provided·for in paragraph l of Article 16 .. 
'/ 
Article 10 · 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIE AGREE:MENT. 
.  ,,· 
1  ~  The terms of this Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and with d·ue regard 
c.
1 to the legitimate commerCial  interests, whether international or domestic;· of either Party. 
- -
.  .  . 
2.  This Agreement shall_  be implemented in a manner designed : 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
to avoid hampering· or delaying the nuciear activities in. the. territorY of either 
Party~ 
to avoid interference insuch activi~iesi 
to be consistent with prudent management practices requi,red for the economic 
· and  ~afe conduct of such activities;  · (d)  to  take  full  account  of the  long-term  requirements  of the  nuclear  en~rgy 
programmes in  place in  the Community and in. the U.S.A. 
3.  The provisions of this Agreement shall  not be used for the purpose of : 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
securing unfair commercial or industrial advantages, or of restricting trade to 
the disadvantage of persons and  undertakings of either Party or hampering 
their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic; 
interfering  with  the  nuclear  policy  or programmes of either  Party  nor  for 
·hindering the promotion of the peaceful·uses of nuclear energy. 
impeding the  free  movement of nuclear material,  non-nuclear material  and 
equipment within the territory of the Community.  ·  · 
4.  ·In exercising the rights arising from  other nuclear co-operation agreements it might 
have concluded with third  parties,  each Party to this agreement will  pay due regard to the 
legitimate commercial interests of the other Party; in case of difficulty either Party may call 
for consultations which shall take place within 40 days, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 12. 
Article 11 
. PHYSICAL PROTECTION 
1.  ·  Nuclear  material  transferred  pursuant  to  this  Agreement  arid  special  fissionable 
material  used  in  or produced through  the use of non-nuclear material,  nuclear material  or 
equipment so transferred shall be subject to adequate measures of physical protection. 
2.  Such physical protection measures shall be at levels which shall satisfy the criteria set 
out  in  Annex  C  to  IAEA  document  INFCIRC  2S4/Revl!Part1  (Guidelines  for  nuclear 
transfers) as it  may  be revised  and  accepted by  the Parties and the Member States of  the 
Community.  As a supplement to this document, the Member States of the Community, the 
Commission of  the European Communities (as appropriate), and the United States of America 
will  refer,  when  applying  these  measures,  to· the  recommendations  of IAEA  document 
INFCIRC 225/Rev.3 on the. Physical Protection ofNuclear Material, as it may be revised and 
accepted by the Parties and the Member States of the Community. 
3:  International transport of nuclear material  subject to this Agreement shall  be  ~ubje~t 
to  the  provisions  of the  International  Convention  on  the Physical  Protection  of Nuclear 
_ Material  (INFCIRC 274/Rev.l), as  it  may  be revised  and  accepted  by  the Parties and the 
Member States of the Community. Article 12 
CONSULTATION AND ARBITRATION 
1.  The Parties shall consult at the request of  either of  them to promote co-operation under 
this  Agreement  and  to  ensure  its  effective  implementation.  A  Joint Committee  shall  be 
. established for these purposes.  This Co.mmittee  will  also consult on  nuclear questions of 
mutmil interest and anyoiher significant matters relating to the co-operation envi~ged  by this 
Agreement.  A Joint Technical'Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set 
•  up to ensure the fulfilment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangement referred 
to in ArtiCle  16.  ·  · 
.·  :2. ·  .  The Parties shall consult, auhe request of either of them, on any question·arising out 
of the interpretation or application of this Agreement 
3.  •.  .  .Any dispute arising out of  the interpretation or application of this Agreement shallbe 
settled by negotiation,  mediation, conciliation or other· similar procedure or, if  both Parties. 
agree,  by  s_ubmission  to ah  ar~itral tribunal  which shall  be composed of three arbitrators 
. appointed In accordance with the provisions of  this paragraph.  Each Party shall designate one 
arbitrator an~  the tWo arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, anational of  a country other 
than the United States pr a Member State qfthe Community, who shall be the Chairman.  If, 
·within thirty days pf the request for arbitration, a Party has not designated an arbitrator, the 
·other Party may  request the President. of the International  Court .of Justice to appoint an 
arbitrator.  The  same  procedure  shall  apply  if,  within thirtY  days  of the  designation  or 
~ppointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not ·been elected, provided that 
the third. arbitrator so appointed shall not be a national of the United States or of  a Member 
·.  State· of  the Community.  All decisions shall require the concurrence of  two arbitrators.  ·The 
··,arbitral. procedure· shall  be fixed  by  Pte· tribunal..  The  de~isions of the  tribunal· shall be 
,  bindi.ng~on .the Parties. · 
Article  13 
SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION 
A.  CIRCUMSTANCES· 
1.  If either Party or a Member State· of the Community at any  time following the entry 
into force of this Agreement:  · 
(a) 
(b) 
materially acts in  violation of the fundamenttl. provisions of Articles {  5,' .6, 
· 7, ·1 0 or 11  of the Agreement or contravenes a decision of the arbitral. tribunal 
referred to in ArtiCle  12 of this Agreement,. or  ·  ·  ·  · 
takes action of any kind which  results in a material violation of its obligations 
under this Agreement, including prev.entio'n  of nuclear trade envisaged under 
this Agreement,  ·, the other Party shall  have the right·to cease further co-operation under this Agreement 9r to 
'suspend or terminate,-in  whole or in part, this Agreement  - · 
2.  If either Party or a ·Member State of the Community at any time following entry into 
force of this Agreement terminates or abrogates a safeguards ~greement  with the Agency and 
the safeguards agreement so .terminated or abrogated has not been replaced by an equivalent 
· safeguards agreement when appropriate and relevant, the other Party shall have the right to 
require the return in whole or in part of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or eql;lipment 
transferred pursuant to this Agreement and special fissionable material produced through the 
use of such items. 
3. ·  .If  the Community or a non-nuclear weapon State member of  the Community detonates 
a nuclear explosive device, the Government of the United States of  America shall have the 
right specified in paragraph 2 of this Article. 
4.  If a nuclear-:-weapon-State member of the Community detonates a nuclear explosive 
device  using  any  item  subject  to this  Agreement,  the  United  States  shaJl  have the  right· 
. specified in paragraph 2 of this Article. _ 
s~  If the United States of America detonates a nuclear explosive device .using any item 
subject tothis Agreement, the Community shall have the right specified in paragraph 2_ofthis 
· Article·. 
B.  IMPLEMENTATION 
6.  Before either Party decides to take action pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 5 above, the 
Parties· shalL hold  consultations  for  the  purpose  of taking  corrective  measures .and  shall 
carefully oonsider the effects of such action, taking into account the need to make such other 
appropriate  arrangements  as  may  be  required  and,  in  particular,  to  ensure. security  and 
cqntinuity of supply and adequate time for replacement and further to honour commitments 
to third countries and_theiLindustrial entities. 
7.  Before taking action under this Article,  the Parties shall  consider whether the facts 
triggering.such steps were .caused  deliberately. 
8.  Action under this Article shall only ·be 'taken if the other Party fails to take corrective 
measures wi.thin  an. appropriate period of time following consultations. 
9.  If either Party  exercises its  right,  pursuant  to  paragraphs 2 to  5 of this Article,  to 
require the return of any  items,  it shall,  prior to the removal  from  the territory or from  the 
control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof 
and for the costs iricurred as a consequence of such removal.  If the return of nuclear items 
is to be required,  the J;>arties  shall  determine jointly the relevant quantity of nuclear items, 
taking account of  the circumstances involved. The Parties shall further satisfy themselves that 
full  safety,  radiological  and physical  protection measures, in  accordance with their existing 
obligations, are taken in  relation to the return of the items,  that no unreasonable risks are 
incurred and that the return of items-takes place in a I;J1anner consistent with all  the relevant · 
laws and  regulatio~s of the Parties.  · 141 
Article 14 
DURATION AND AMENDMENT 
1.  This Agreement shall  enter into force  on  the  d~te o~ ·which  the Parties exchange 
diplof!latic notes informing each other that their respective ~ntemal procedures necessary -for. 
its entry'  into force have been  co~pleted:  -; 
2.  ·  Thi~ Agreement shall :remain in force f~r a period of thirty years and shall. continue 
in force thereafter for additional periods of five years each. Either Party inay,·by givirig six 
months' written notice to the other P~;·  terminate this Agreement at the end ·of the ·initial 
'thirty/ year period or at the end of ariy subsequent five year period. 
.  . 
. 3.  Notwithstanding· the  terlniriation  or  suspension  of this  Agreement,  the- rights  and 
obligations pursuant to Articles 6, 7, 8.l.(C) and  11  and to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5,  ~. 9,  10,  11· . 
and  12 of the Agr_eed Minute shall continue in  effe~t.  -
. 4.  - If a Party gives to the other Party the written notice provided for i'n  paragraph 2, or · 
if a  Party suspends or terminates this Agreement pursuant to Article 13 .1,  the Parties shall 
· hold consultations as soon as possible but not later than one month afterwards, forthe purpose 
·  of deciding jointly whether, in addition to those referted ~o in paragraph 3 of this Article,  ·  · 
furth-er rights and obligations arising out of this Agreement, and in particular' out 6f Artic!e . 
.  ·. 8.l  (A), ·8.1.(B), 8.1.(0), 8.2. and 8.3. and· the Agreed Minute relating thereto, shall continue 
in ·effect.  - · 
5.  If the PC1f!ies are u~able to teach a joint decision pursuant to paragraph 4,_  · 
a.  quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the inventory described in Article 
20.-1., and items of equipment described in  ArtiCle 20.2., shall-continue _to he 
subject 'io  the. provisions of Articles  8.-1 :(A), :8.l.(B). 8.I.(D), 8.2., 83. and 
· Article  i3  and  their Agreed  Minute  but only  to  the  ~xtent covered:  by  the 
Agreements referred to-·in  Article  19:.  · ·  · 
b.·  Tne· question  whether  furth~r rights· -and.  obligations,  in  addition  to  those  · 
referred  to  in  paragraph 3  ·an·d ·subparagraph  (a)  of this paragraph  of this 
ArtiCle,  shall continue in effect in  relation to riuclear material and equipment . 
not  cov'ered  py  sub-paragraph  (a),. and to all  non-iniclear materiai,  shall  be 
.  submitted  to  an  arbitraltnb~nal  composed  pursuant  to  Article  1·2_.3.  The 
-·tribunal shall make its decision on the t:lasis of the application of  the rules.artd  . 
.  principles ofintemationallaw, and in particular the Vienna Convention on the· 
Law of Treaties.  ·  ·  -- · 
c.  _If th·e  arbitral  tribunal  decides  that rights  and  obligations  other than  those' 
referred to in- paragraph  3  of this -Article  shall  not  continue in  effect- with 
respect  to  non-nuclear  material,  nuclear  material  and  equipment subject  to 
arbitration  pursuant to subparagraph  (b),~eit~er Party shall  have the right to 
require,. subject to the procedures  provided for in  ArtiCle  13.9,. the return of· 
21 such non.:nuclear material, nuclear material and  equipment in the terrjtory of 
the other Party on the day of termination of this Agreement 
d._  Until  the  Parties  reach  a joint .decision  or the  arbitral  tribunal  renders  its 
decision,  this  Agreement will  remain  in  force  notwithstanding  the  written 
notice pursuant to para. 2  . 
.  · 6.  ·The Parties may  consult,  at  the request of either,  on  possible amendments to  this 
Agreement, particularly to take account of international developments in the field of nuclear 
safeguards. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall 
enter into force on the date on which  the Parties exchange  diplomatic notes informing each 
other that their respective internal  procedures necessary  for its entry  into force have been 
completed .. 
Article 15 
MULTIPLE OBLIGATIONS 
1.  · The Parties shall endeavour to avoid any difficulties arising out of the overlapping of 
obligations on nuclear material as a result of  the application of  several agreements concerning 
international tn:lde. 
2.  The Parties shall promote multilateral consultations with a view to achieving mutually 
satisfactory solutions at international level.· · 
Article  16 
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT 
1.  The  ·appropriate  authorities  of  the  Parties  shall  establish  an  Administrative 
Arrangement in  order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this 
Agreem.ent. 
2  The principles of fungibility,  equivalence and  proportionality shall apply to nuclear 
material  subject to the Agreement and the detailed provisions thereof will  be set out in  the 
Administrative Arrangement. 
3.  An Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended 
by written agreement between the appropriate authorities of the Parties.  . 
20 '  . 
Article  17 
INTELLECTUAL' PROPERTY 
I;  The Parties shall apply international rules they have both formally accepted governing· 
the. treatment of  intellectUal property and technology transfers to intellectual property created 
·  · or transferred and  technology~  transferred  pursua~t to this Agreement. 
.. 
2.  - Annex· (B) shall apply to intellectual property created or transferred and technology . · 
transferred pursuant to this Agreement..·  · 
.  .  . 
3. ·  The Parties shall ensure that individual agreements they .enter into pursuant to Aimex  . 
B are consistent With this Agreement and with any additional rules concerning treatment of · 
sensitive or confidential information._in ·the nuclear field that may be agreed by the Parties.  · 
'  I  . 
Article 18 
. STATUS OF ANNEXES 
The  Annexes· form  an  integral  part  of this  Agreement ·and,  unless  expressly  provided 
otherwise: a reference to this Agreement includes its_Annexes. 
•  TERMINATION OF EXISTING AGREE:MENTS · 
1.  The  Agreement  between  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  and  the 
Government of the United Stiltes  .. of.America that  entered into force on 27 August 1958Jand 
the  Additional  Agreement for  Co-operation  that  entered· into force  on  25  July  1960,  as 
. subsequently amended, . shall· be_ term-inated upon the entry into force qf this  Agreement~  . 
2 ..  ·  Th~-bilateral  nuclear co-operation agreernents that the .United  States of America has:  · 
concluded with the Republic of Austria, on  11  July 1969,.the Kingdom of  Spain, on 20 March , 
1974, the Portuguese Republic, on  16 May  1974,the Kingdom of Sweden,  on 19December 
1983, and the Republic of Finland, ori  2 May  1985, shall  be terminated upon the entry into 
force of this Agreement. The rights and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising out 
of such agreements shall  be  replaced by those ofthis Agreement. 
3:  •  The rights and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising out of a _nuclear co-
operation agreement between the United States of America and  any  third State that accedes.· 
to the Community after the entry into force of this .Agreement shall be replaced by those of 
this Agreement upon  accession by that .State to  the Community.  The rights and obligations 
with respect to other areas of nuclear co~operation shall be the subject of  negotiations between· 
the Community, the -United  States of America and  the third state concerned, in  accorda~ce 
with the provisions of Article 106 of the Euratom Treaty .. the Community,  the United States of ~erica and the third state concerned, in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 106 of the Euratpm Treaty:  ,. 
/ 
Article 20 
INITIAL INVENTORIES 
1.  ·The provisions of this  Agreement shall· apply  to the inventory· of nuclear material 
' formerly subject to the agreements referred to in Article 19. from the date such agreements 
are territinated pursuant to the provisions of that Article. 
2.  The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to equipment and non-nuclear material 
transferred pursuant to the agreements referred to in Article 19 only to the extent cover:¢ by 
those-agreements.  -
.  .  .  . 
3.  The inventories of  nuclear material, equipment and non-nuclear material subject to the 
agreenien~ referred to in Article _19  shall be approved by the appropriate authorities of the 
Parties. 
Artic1e 21 
DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of this Agreement: 
1.  ·  "Parties" means the Government ()f the United States of America and the European 
Atomic Energy Community. 
'2.  a}  "Community" means both: 
I.  the  legal  person  created  by  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Atomic En_ergy  Community (Euratom), Party to this Agreement; 
II.  the territories to which the Euratom Treaty applies; 
b)  "within the Community" ~eans within the territories to which the Euratom 
Treaty applies; 
c)  "beyond the Community" has the corresponding meaning. 
3.  "Appropriate· authority" means,  in  the case of the United  States of America,  the 
, Department of State; in the case of the Community, the European Commission, or such other 
authority as  t~e Party  conc~med may  at any  time notify to the other Party; 
4.  "Equipment" means ,any reactor as a complete unit, other than· one designed or used 
primarily for  the formation  of plutonium  or uranium-233  or  any  other item so designated 
jointly by  the appropriate authorities of the Parties. 
2\.{ .  ~  . 
5.  "Non-nuclear material"· means heavy  water,  or any other material suitable for use 
in  a  reaCtor  to  slow down  high  velocity  neutrons  <1nd  increase the  likdih<;>od  of further 
fission,  as may be jointly designated by  the appropriate authorities of the Parties~  .. 
6.  "Nuclear material". means (1)  source material and (2) special  fissionable material. 
"Source 111aterial" means uranium· containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in  nature~ 
'uranium  depleted  in  the isotope  235~ thorium~ any  of the foregoing in the form  of metal, 
alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the 
foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall  from time to 
time  determine~ and  such  other materials as  the· Board. of Governors of the  Agency  may 
determine or as  may  be agreed  by  the  appropriate  authorities  of both  Parties.  "Special 
fissionable material" means plutonium, uraniurn-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 
· or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as 
·the Board of  Governors of  the Agency may determine or as rriay be agreed by the appropriate 
authorities of  both Parti'es .. "Special fissionable material" does not include 
11Source materiill". 
Any  determination  by  the  Board  of Governors  of the  Agency  under Article  XX  of !hat 
Agency's Statute or otherwise .that amends  the. list of materials  considered  to  be  "source 
. matenal" or '-"special  fis~ionable material"· shall  only have effect under this Agreement when 
both Parties to  thi~ Agreement 'have informed each other in  writing that they  accept such 
amendment.  '  .  '  .  '  .. 
7.  "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to more than twenty percent in 
'  ·"- .  ' 
the isotope 235 (and/or uranium 233); "low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to 
twenty percent or  less in the isotope ·235  (and/or uranium 233); 
8.  •  The following definitions relate to Article· 17  and AnneX' B: 
- "Cooperative activity" means any joint  activity carried on urider this Agreement, 
and includes joint research.  ·  · 
-"Information" means scientific or technicar'data, results or methods of research and 
dev'etopmerit  stemming  from.'  the joint 'research  and  any  other information  dee~ed 
. necessary  to. be  provided  or exchanged  under  this  Agreement or !esearch pursuant 
th~reto.  · 
- "Joint research" means research  ~ndertaken jointly by  the Parties directly .or.  on 
their behalf by  a person,  legal. entity,  research .institute or other body  d~signated by 
a Party or research undertaken. jointly by  participants.  ·  · 
- "P~rticipant"  means  a  person,  legal  entity,  r.esearch  institute  or· other .body 
participating i.n joint research  but not on  beha,lf of one of the Parties. 
9.  "Persons and undertakings" means any natural ·person who, and.any undertaking or 
institution, whatever its public or private legal status; which.pursues all ·or any of  its activities 
· within the Community or in the territory of the United States of America within the ·scope of. 
this Agreement.  ·  , 
. 2J 10.  '"Alteration, in  form  or content"  means conversion of plutonium,  high  enric.hed 
uranium or uranium 233  or fabrication of fuel  containing plutonium, high enriched urariium 
or  uranium  233;  it  does  not  include  post. irradiation  examination  involving  chemical 
dissolution  or  separation,  dissasembly  or  reassembly  of  fuel  assemblies,  irradiation, 
reprocessing ·or enrichment. 
1  L  "Storage facility"  means  any  facility  (or any  part of a  facility  so designated  by 
inclusion in one of the lists referred to in Article 8.3) the primary purpose and function of· 
which is the separate storage of sensitive nuclear material as described in paragraphs (i), (ii) 
and (iii) of Article 8.3 under adequate conditions of control, safety and safeguards as well as 
of physical protection as described in Article 11.2.  ·  · 
In Witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by the Government of  the 
United States _and  the European Atomic Energy Community respectively,  have signed this 
Agr<?emerit.  · 
Done at Brussels on 
duplicate. 
1995 and at Washington on  1995, in 
For the EuropeanAtomic Energy Community,  For the United States of America AGREED MINUTE 
During· the negotiation of the Agreement for Co-operation in  the peaceful  use~ of nuclear. 
energy between the United States of America and the Community signed today, the followjng 
understandings, which shall be an  integral part of the  Agreeme~t, were  reach'~d. 
A. PEACEFUL PURPOSES 
I.  The Parties  agree  that,  with  reference  to  Article  7,  "peaceful  purposes"  includes 
provision of  power for a military base drawn  from  any  power network  or productiqn of .' 
radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in a military hospital.  · 
.  .  .  \  . 
B.  NUCLEAR FUEL· CYCLE ACTIVITIES. 
2.  Upon  entry  into Jorce of this  Agreement, 'the Parties shan· exchange lists of 'third 
countries to whi<;:h  retransfers pursuant to Article 8.1.(C)(i) may be made by the other Party. 
Eligibility  for  continued .  inclusion  ori  -such  lists  shall  he  based,  as  a  minimum,  upon 
satisfaction of the following criteria :  .  . .  . 
third countries must have made effective non-proliferation commitments, normally by· 
being party to,  and  in full  respect of their' obligations under the  Non:.Proliferation 
Treaty pr the Treaty of  Tlatelolco and by being in compliance with the conditions ·or 
INFCIRC 254/Rev.l/Partl, and  . 
in  ~ase of retransfer of items obligated_ to  the United States fro~ the 'territory of $e 
Member States of  the  Community,  third  countries  must oe party  to  a·  nuclear co-
operation agreement with the United States.  ·  · 
3.  Should retransfers pursuant to Article 8.1.(C)(ii) and (iii) be requested in the future 
by a Party~ a list ofthii~d countries to which'such retransfers maybe made, shall be provided 
by. the other Party.  In  this  connection,  the Parties  shall  take  into account the  following 
additional criteria: 
consistency of the proposed action with the guidelines contained in IAEA .document 
INFCIRC 225/Rev.3 and with the.provisions of IAEA document INFCIRC 274/Rev~  I, 
as they may be revised and  accepted by the Parties arid  the Member States;  .  · 
the  nature  and  content  of the  peacefl,Jl· -nuclear  programs of, the  third  country  in 
question; 
the potential proliferation and security implications of the transfer for. either Party or 
a Member State of the  Commu~ity. 4.  Either Party may add eligible third countries to its lists at any time. Either Party ~ay 
delete third countries from its lists following consultations with the other Party. Neither Party 
shall  delete third countries from  its lists for the purpose of obtaining commercial advantage 
or of delaying, hampering or hindering the peaceful nuclear programmes of the other Party 
or its peaceful nuclear co-operation with third countries. The Parties will co-operate in efforts 
to obtain as soon as possible on ·a generic basis a confirmation from the third countries on the 
lists that any retransferred items will  be subject to any agreement for co-:operation in force 
between  the  receiving  country  and  the  non-retransferring  Party.  The  receipt  of such 
. confirmation shall  not constitute a pre-condition  for the addition of a third country to the 
lists.  · 
5.  The Parties agree that,  notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4,  the 
_provisions set out in the Exchange ofNotes dated  18 July  1988 between the Commission of 
the European  Communities and  the United States  Mission  to  the European Communities. 
concerning the Agreement for Co-operation in-the Peaceful Uses of  Nuclear Energy between 
. the. United States of America and  Japan  shall  remain in  effect as  long as  this Agreement 
remains in force. The Parties confirm that the above-mentioned provisions shall apply, inter 
alia,  to  plutonium  contained  in  mixed  oxide  fuel.  The  consents granted  therein  may  be 
suspended only if an event of the same or greater degree of seriousness as those referred to 
i~·paragraph 8 arises which·directly threatens either the retransfer or' the activities involving 
·the retransferred plutonium inJapan.  · 
6.  With reference to.  paragraph  2 of Article 8  of the Agreement and· notwithstanding 
paragraph 6 of Article 14, .either Party, acting through its appropriate authorities, may make 
.  changes to the peaceful nuclear programmes it has  delineate~ by notifying the other Party in 
writing  in  accordance ·with  the  procedures  set  forth _  below  and  receiving  a  written 
acknowledgement. 
.7.  . Such acknowledgement shall be 'given no ·tater than thirty days after the receipt of the 
notification  and  shall  be  limited  to  a  statement  that  the  notification  has  been  received. 
Intended changes in  delineated programmes shall  receive the fullest possible consideration 
during consultations under the  Agr~ement, which may include discussions on safeguards. 
(A)  For an  addition of a facility within its territorial jurisdiction to the peaceful  nuclear 
programme delineated by the Community, the notification shall  contain:  · 
(i)  the name, type and location of the facility and its existing or planned capacity; 
(ii)  a confirmation that the Euratom  Saf~guards Regulation 3227/76, as amended, 
is fully  a·pplied; 
(iii)  for a facility to be under IAEA safeguards inspections pursuant to a safeguards 
agreement referred to in paragraph I (a), (b) or (c) of  Article 6, a confirmation 
that relevant safeguards arrangements have been agreed upon with the IAEA 
and that those arrangements will  permit the IAEA to, exercise fully  its rights 
pursuant  to  the  aforementioned· safeguards  agr~ements, in  the light  of how 
these agreements are implemented during the life of this Agreement and so a~ 
to enable the IAEA to meet its objectives and  inspectiongoal. 
2~ . (iv) 
'(v). 
·such  non-confidential  information as  is available to the Community on. the 
.  IAEA safeguards approach and information on Eu~atom saJeguatds relevant to 
the  facility~,  ·  ·  -· 
.'t, 
a confirmation that·physic~l protection measures as required by. Article 11  of 
this Agreement will  be applied. 
,·'·.! 
. (B)  . ·For an addition of a fa,cilit}r  within its territorlal jurisdiction to the delineated · 
peaceful nuclear programme of the .United States, the notification shall contain: 
! . 
(i)  . the name, 'type and location of the facility and its existing or planned  . 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
capacity~ 
for  facilities  licensed.  or  certified  by  the  United  States · Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, a confirmation that the F:undamental Nuclear 
Material· Control  Plan,  describing how the requirements of the U.S . 
. Code of  Federal  Regulations, Title 10,  ~art 74,  as1 amended, will be 
met, has been· approved for the facility;  for United States Departmer1t 
of Energy  civil  facilities,  a  confirmation  that  .the ·facility  is  in 
r compliance with the requirements of the Department of Energy Ord~r 
5633.3B,  "Control  an~  Accountability  of. Nuclear  Materials,"  and 
: associated guides, as amendec:l; 
for  -~ facility to be under IAEA 'safeguards inspebtions ptirsuan{  to the 
safeguards agreement referred to in. paragraph l  (d} of Article 6,  a 
.·confirmation  that  the  relevant 'safeguards  arrangem~nt.s have  been 
agreed· upon with the IAEA and thai those arrangements will permit the 
IAEA. to  exercise  fully  its  rights  pursuant  to  the  aforementioned 
safeguards  agreement,  in . the . light  ·of  how.  this  agreement  'is 
imJ>lemented during the life of this Agreement and so as to enable the 
IAEA to meet its objectives and inspection goal;  · 
information on the basicTeatu~es contained in the Fundamental Nuclear 
Material  Control Plan  or  the  compliance  with  the  Department  of 
Energy Order referred to above, and such non-confidential information · 
as is available to the United States on the IAEA safeguards approach;· 
and  · 
.  ' 
a confirmation that physical protection measures as required by Article 
11  of this Agreement will  be applied. 
(C)  Either Party may  delete  a  facility 'from  the  peaceful  nuclear  programme  it  has 
delineated,  by_ providing to the other Party  a  notification containing the facility  name and 
other rel'evant information available. 8.  A.  The activities referred to in  paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Agreement,.may 
1'-•  •I 
·proceed as  long as  those  provisions continue  ~n effect with respect to the peaceful 
nuclear programme delineated by a Party, unless the other Party considers, pursuant 
to the procedures set out below, that these activities shoul~ be suspended  on the basis 
of objective  evidence  that  their continuation  would  entail  a  serious  threat  to  the 
sectirity  of either Party  or of a Member State .of the Community, or a  significant 
increase in the risk o( a nuclear proliferation, resulting from  a situation of the same 
or grea~er degree of seriousness as the following:  · 
a) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
.(vi) 
(b) 
(i) 
(ii) 
With regard to the Community : 
a non-nuclear-weapon  State member of the Community detonates a nuclear 
weapon or any  other nuclear explosive device;  . 
a nuclear-weapon State member of  the Community detonates a nuclear weapon 
or .  any  other  nuclear  explosive  device  using  any  item  subject  to  this 
Agreement; 
· a Member State of the Community or the Community, a~ relevant, materially 
violates, terminates, or declares itself not to be bound by, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty or the relevant safeguards agreements referred to in Article 6.1, or the 
Guidelines .applicable to the transfers of  nuclear items laid down in document 
INFCIRC 254/Rev 1./Partl, as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties; 
·a  Member  State  of the  Community  retransfers  an  item  subject  to  this 
Agreement to a  non-nuclear:-Weapon  State which has not concluded a full-
scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 
a  Member State  of the Community  is  subjected  to measures  taken  by  the 
Board of Governors  of the  IAEA,  pursuant  to  Article  19  of the  relevant 
safeguards.Agr~ement referred· to in Article 6.l.{a), (b) or (c); 
acts of  war or serious internal· disturbances preventing the maintenance of law 
and  order,  or serious international  tension  constituting a threat of war, that 
threaten severely and directly the safeguarding or physical protection of such 
activities. 
With regard to the United States: 
the United States detonates a nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive 
device using any item  subject to this Agreement; 
the United  States materially violates,  terminates or declares itself not to  be 
bound by, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the relevant safeguards agreement 
referred to in  Article "6.l.(d),  or the Guidelines applicable to the transfers .of 
nuclear items laid down in document INFCIRC 254/Rev.l/Part 1, as it may be 
·revised and  accepted by  the Parties;  · 
3o (iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
the  United  States  retransfers  an  item  subject  to  this  Agreement  to~ a  n.on- . 
· nuclear-weapon  state  ,which  has  not · concluded  a  full-scope  safeguards 
agreement with ihe IAEA;: 
the United States is subjected to measures taken by the/Board of Governors of· 
the  IAEA,  pursuant to  Article  19  of the  safeguards  agreement  referred  in 
Article 6.1.(  d); 
acts of war or serious internal distUrbances preventing the maintenance of law 
and  order or serious  international  tension  constituting a threat of war,  that 
. threaten severely and directly the safeguarding or physical protection of such 
activities. .  .  . 
.  . 
.  .  .  :  .  . 
B.·  The Party considering that .such  objective evidence may  exist,  shall consult 
with  the  other  Party,  at  Cabinet  level  for  the  United  States  and  at  European 
Commission level for the Community, before reaching any decision. 
-C.  Any such decision that  su~h objective evidence does exist, and that activities 
..  referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 should therefore be suspendec:l, shall be taken· 
only by the President of the United States or by the Council of the European Union, 
as  the case may be, and shall.be notified ;in writing to the other Party. 
D.  Any 'decision taken  by  a Party pursuant to this paragraph shall  apply  to the 
activities of the other Party referred to in Article 8,  paragraph· 2 of this Agreement, 
taken as a whole. · 
E.  The Parties confirm that, as of the time· of entry into 'force of  this Ag~eement, 
there eXiStS nO ObjeCtiVe evidenCe Of any Of the threatS referred tQ clPOVe and that. they  I 
~ do not foresee any sucll threats developing -in  the future.  . 
9.  Actions of governments of third countries or events beyond the territorial jurisdiction 
of either Party shall not be used as a basis for invoking the provisions of paragraph 8 with 
respect to activities or facility operations within that Party's territorial jurisdiction unless, due 
to such  actions  or events,  those  activities  or facility  operations  would  clearly  result  in  a 
significant increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation or in a serious threat to the security of 
the Party invoking the provisions of  paragraph 8. ·  ·  · 
'.  I 0.  The Party invoking the provisions of paragraph 8 shall keep under constant review the 
development of the situation which prompted the decision and shall withdraw. its invocation 
·as soon as  warranted~ 
11.  The provisions of paragraph 8 shall  not be invoked due .to differences over the nature 
of the  Parties'· peaceful  nuclear  programmes  or fuel: cycle  choices,  or for  the  purpose of 
obtaining commerci~li advantage, or of delaying, hampering or hindering the peaceful nuclear 
programmes or activities of the. other Party, or its.  p~aceful nuclear co-operation with  third 
countries. 12.  Any decision to invoke the provisions of paragraph 8 shall only be taken in the !]lOst . 
extreme circumstances of exceptional  concern from  a non-proliferation or security point of 
view and  shall  be applied  for the  minimum  period· of time necessary  to deal  in  a manner 
acceptable to the Parties with the exceptional case. 
.  . 
13.  Should the activities agreed upon  i_n  paragraph 2  of Article 8 of the Agreement be 
suspended,  as  provided  in  paragraph  8,  quantities  of nuclear  material  equivalent  to  the 
inventory  described  in ·Article  20.1  shall,  at  the  option  of the  Party  against  which  the 
suspension is applied, be regarded during such suspension as subject to this Agreement but 
only to the extent covered by  the agreements referred to in Article 19. 
C. PROPORTIONALITY 
14.  For the purpose of implementing the provisions of Article 8 and paragraphs 2-5  of 
Article  13  with respect to special .fissionable material  produced through the use of nuclear 
material and/or non-nuclear material transferred pursuant to the Agreement, when such nuclear 
. material and/or non-nuclear material is used in equipment not so transferred, such provisions 
shall be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material produced that represents the 
ratio of  transferred nuclear material and/or non-nuclear material used in the production of the 
special fissionable material. to the total amount of  nuclear material and/or non-n1,1clear material 
so us~d. 
D.  RESULTING OBLIGATIONS 
15.  The obligations .arising out of Articles 6, 7 and  11 ·in relation to special fissionable 
material produced through theuse of  nuclear material subject to the Agreement in  equipment 
not transferred under the Agreement may' be satisfied without specific tracking of  that special 
fissionable material. When such special fissionable material is subsequently used in equipment 
not so transferred, that equipment shall, during such use, be operated for peaceful applications 
only:  ·  · 
E.  SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION' 
16. .  Both· sides  regard  it. as  extremely  unlikely  that  actions  would  be  taken  by  the 
Community, its Member States or the United States of America which would cause the other 
Party to invoke the rights specified in  Article 13.  Nonetheless this Article reflects the firm 
conviction of both Parties that they would view with the utmost concern acts constituting a 
material  violation  or  breach. of non-proliferation  commitments  by  any  country  and  that 
appropriate  actions such  as  those  provided  for' in  Article  13  would  be. taken  by  the 
CommunitY, its Member States or the United States of America in  response to any material 
violation of non-proliferation commitments. 
17.  No  violation  may  be  considered  as  being  material  unless  corresponding  to  the 
definition of material violation ·or breach contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. ·is.  Additionally,  a:  determination as to whether-there has been a material violation of the 
fundamental  safeguards commitments contained in  the safeguards agreements referred to in 
Article 6:1.  or in such other agreement.as may amend  o~ replace them~ would only be made 
by the President of the United States of America or the ·Council of  the European Union,  as 
relevant.  In  making  such ,  a  determination, a  crucial  factor will  ~e whether the Board  of· · 
G~vemors of  the Agency has ·made a finding of non-compliance.  · 
.~ ... , 
' . .  ; 
ANNEX A (Art.  8) 
EURATOM DELINEATED. PEACEFUL PROGRAM 
REPROCESSING FACILITIES 
COGEMA - ET  ABLISSEMENT DE LA HAGUE  LA HAGUE 
COGEMA - USINE UP-I- .  MARCOULE 
BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS pic  SELL  AFIELD 
AEA TECHNOLOGY  DOUNREAY 
ALTERATION IN FORM OR CONTENT FACILITIES 
BELGONUCLEAIRE - USINE DE FABRICATION  MOL 
D'ELEl'vffiNTS PU 
.--:  .  . 
FBFC INTERNATIONAL - ASSEMBLAGE DES  DESSEL 
COMBUSTffiLES MOX 
SIEl'vffiNS BRENNELEl'vffiNTEWERK - .  HAN  AU 
BETRIEBSTEIL MOX-VERARBEITUNG. 
CERCAIET  ABLISSEMENT DE ROMANS  ROMANS 
SUR ISERE 
SOCIETE INDUSTRIELLE DE COMBUSTffiLE  VEUREY 
NUCLEAIRE 
COGEMA - COMPLEXE DE FABRICATION  CADARACHE 
DES COMBUSTIBLES 
ET  ABLISSEMENT l\1ELOX  MARCOULE 
AEA TECHNOLOGY - MTR FUEL  DOUNREAY 
BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS pic - SELLAFIELD 
MOX FACILITY 
FRANCE 
FRANCE· 
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KINGDOM 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
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FRANCE 
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ANNEX  A 
U .·S.  DEL. I NEJ\Tt-:D  PEJ\CEF1JT:  NUCLEAR  PROGRAM 
.':  ·  .. 
I.  Facilities  for  reprocessing  or  alteration  in ,form  or 
conte~t of  plutonium,  uranium  233  ~nd high  ehriched ·ur~hium  1n 
an  agg!egate  quantity'exceeding.one  (1)  eff~ctive  kilo~ram 1 
1\.  '  REPROCESSING  FJ\CIJ.ITIES 
None  / 
B.  FACILITIES  FOR  ALTERATION IN  FORM  OR  CONTE-NT 
Nuclear  Fuel  S~rvices 
. P.O~  Box  3~7,  M~l23 
Erwin,, TN  3765Q 
1.  CONVERSION  PLANTS 
Urariium  downbl~nding  7,000  kgs  U-235. 
Raqioch~rnistry .  .  Conversion. 
P·ro:cessing  Pi lot Piant 
·,.  Less  than  1000·~~.  of  HEU_·'and  more . ' 
. than  100  kg  of  :;  Oak  Ridge  Nat'l  Lab 
P.O.  Bo>.::  X  . U-233.  . 
Oak  Ridge,  TN  37830 
I  .. 
.,. 
2. ·  FUEL-FABRICATION  AND  PROCESSING  PLANTS 
liN'1lLP nd  LOCATION 
Genera.l  Atomfcs· 
P.O.  Box  81608 
Sari  Diego,  CA·  92138 
-F~el  f~brication for 
TRIGA  research· 
reactors  .. 
\' 
.  '  -~ 
>20%  enr  U,  100  kg 
U-235. 
II.  Facilities  for  r~processing or  alteration  in  for~ or  content 
of plutohium,  uranium  Z33  and  high  enriched ,.uranium  in an··' 
aggr~gate quantity  not  to  exceed  one  (1)  effective  kilogram  do 
'  ' 
not  r~quire.specifica~ioni Annex B 
Inte11eC:tual  froperty Rights 
. Pursuant to Article 17 of  this Agreement, rights to intellectual property created or furnished 
under this Agreement shaH be allocated as provided in this Annex:  ·  · 
I.  Applic:ation 
This  annex.  is  applicable to  all  cooperative  activities  undertaken  pursuant  to this 
Agreemen[,  except as otherwise specifically agreed. 
II.  ·•·  Qwnership, Allocation and Exercise of  Righ~ 
.  L  For purposes of this Agreement,  "intellectual. property"  shall  have the mearung 
found in Article 2 of the Convention establishlng the;:  World Intellectual Property 
__ Organisation, done ar Stockholm, July 14,  1967.  · 
:?..  ,This  Annex addresses the allocation of iights. interests and  royalties betWeen the 
Panics and partiCipants.  Each Party shall ensure that the other Party inay obtain the 
·rights to Intellectual property allocated to it in· accordance with this Annex.  This 
Annex. does not otherwise alter or prejudice the allocation between a Party and its 
nationals. which shall be determined by that Party's laws and practiceS.  ·  · 
· 3.  Termimition or expiry of  this Agreement shall not affect 'rights or obligations under 
this Annex.  · 
4.  a)  In the case of cooperative activities betwe:en the Parties. ,intellectual property 
arising from joint research,  i.e.,  cooperativ~ research supponed by both  Parties., . 
shall  be treated in a  Technology  Management Plan according  to  the following 
princi pies :  · 
i.  ·.  The Parties  shall  notify  each  other within  a  reasonable time of any 
int~llectual property righ~ arising· under this Agreement '(or relevant implementing 
arrangements). 
ii.  ·Unless ·otherwise. agreed,  rights  and  interests in intellectual  property 
created during joint research shall be_ exploitable by either Party without territorial 
restriction.  . /. 
,m.  ·Each Party shall seek protection for the intellectual property to which it 
obtains rights and  interests under.the Technology Management Plan in a  timely 
fashion.  ·  · 
36 .  ·~·  ' 
·{  . 
iv..  Each Party shall have a non-ex:clusive,  irrevocable, royalty-free license 
. to use a:ny  intellectual .  property. ansing  under  the  Agreement  for  research  and 
development purpoSes only.  .- · 
·  v_  Visiting :resear~ers ~~  ·receive: intellectual property rights ~d.  royalty . · . 
shares .earned by the host iostitutions from  licensing of suCh intellectUal property 
· rights under the. policies of  the host institutions. 
b) · In all other cases. to the extent reqUired by its laws. and r~gulations. each Party 
shall. require. all  its  ,par1icip~ts· to enter into· specific agreementS  C()ncerning the 
implementation. of  joint reSearch  and the respeetive rights and obligations. of the 
participants. · With 'respect to  intellectual property, the agreement -will  normally 
addre.ss.  among other things, .  ownership.  protection, user  rights for research. and 
. development purposes. exploitation and dissemination. including marigements for  .. 
. joint publication,  the rightS  and  obligations  of ·visiting  research~rs. and·· dispute 
settlement  .·  procedUres. .  The  agreement .  may  also.  address  foreground  and 
· background irifoimation, licensing arid deliverables.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
.  .  '  .  - . 
.  .  .·  . 
6.  While  p1aintaining  the  ·conditions  of competition  in  area$, affected  by  the 
Agreement.. each Party shall· endeavour to ensure that righis acquired. pursuant to 
·this Agreement and arrangementS made under it are eirercised iri such a way as to · 
-encourage,  in  particular  i)  the  use  of information  created,  or .otherwiSe  made 
.  ..  .  . . .available,  .\mder  the  Agreement.  and.· its  dissemination  ~in ·so  far  as  ~IUs is  in · 
accordance both with the conditions set 4)ut .in this Agreement,  the provisions of 
section IV hereof and any rules .wlrich may be in force un~er  the Parties' .domestic 
laws governing treatment of sensitive .or confidenfud  information in the nuclear 
field,  and, ii) f:he adoption and implementation of  intelnati,onal standards. 
.  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  ~ 
' m.  Copyright works 
Consistent with the terms .of. this' Agreement, copyright belonging to the Parties or to 
participants shall be acc(;rded treatment ronsf5tent with Agreement qh Trade Related 
Aspects oflntellecnial Property Rights admi'nistered by the World Trade Organization.  · 
IV.  · Scientific Literary Works 
S~bject to  the  treatment  provided  for  undisclosed  information  in  seetion  V,  the 
. follov.ring procedures shall apply: 
I  . 
I 
1.  Each Party shall be entitled to a non-exc~usive. ~rrevocable, royalty-free -licence in 
all countries  to translate, reproduce, and'publicly distribute information.contained. 
in scientific and technical journals, articles,  reports~ books. or other media, directly 
arising from  joint· research  pursuant .to .this  Agre·e01ent  by  or on  behalf of the 
Parties.  ·  · ·  .  · ·  ·  · 
'· 
I 2.  All publicly distributed c;opies of  a cqpyrighted work prepared under this ,provision 
shall  indicate the  names of the authors of the_ work unless an  author  explici_tly 
declines to be named.  They shall  als~ bear a clearly visible_ acknowledgment of  the  "-
cooperative support of the Parties.  1  •  -- •  •  • 
.  :  .  . 
V.  Undisclosed Information 
'  .  .  I  ·•  .  I 
A. Documentary undisclosed informationon 
1.  Each Party and the participants  sha.J~ identify -at  the earliest possible moment. the 
information  that they wish to remcpn  undisclo~ed in relation to this Agreement. 
taking account. inter alia. of  the fol1owing  ~teria :  ·  - ·.  .  .  . 
j 
tl'te  information is secret in·the ~ense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
configuration  or  assembly  of \ts  components.  generally  known  or  readily 
accessible by laWful  means ;  ; 
I 
.-,  the information has actual or  pot~tial com~ercial valu«? by Virtue of  its secrecy; 
I 
.rhe  information  has  been  subj 1~  to  steps  that  were  reasonabl~e  under  the 
circumstances by the person la~lly in control, to maintain its secrecy; 
•  .  ..  •  ·:,  .  '  ..  .  ,:l  .  ·•. 
; 
The Panies or the participants may in  ~n  cases agree that,  unless otherwise 
indicated,  pans or alt·of the infoi:mation proVided.  exchanged  or created in the  . 
. course of  joint research pursuant·t;o .this Afireement may not be disclosed. 
I 
·.  2.  Each  Party  or participant .shall  ~nsure that 'i.mdisclosed  information  under  the 
Agreement and its  en~uant privileged nature is readily r:-ecognisable as such by the 
other Party· or participant,  for  ~ample by means of an appropriate marking or 
restrictive legend.  This also appli~ to any reproduction of  the said information, in 
whole or in pan.  ·  , · 
A Party or participant receiving u~disclosed  information pursuant to such agreement 
shall·_respect the privileged natufje  thereof.  These limitations shall  automatically 
terminate when this information ls disclosed by the owner Without restriction..  . 
' 
3 ..  UndiscloSed information commuriicated under this Agreement may be disseminated 
by the receiving Party or participant to persons employed by the receiving Party or 
participant including its contract?rs; and other concemed departments of the Party 
or participant authorised for the;specific purposes of the joint research underway, 
provided that any undisclosed information so disseminated shall be protected to the 
extent  provided  by  each  Parcy
1S  laws  and  regulations. and  shall  be  readily 
recognisable as such, as  set out Iabove. 
/ B.  ~on-documentary undisclosed information 
Non-documentary undisclosed or other confidential or privileged information provided 
in seminars and other meetings arranged under the Agreement. orinformation arising 
·  from the attachment of  stiff~ use of faCilities,  or joint projects, will be treated by the· 
· Parues  or· their  designees  according  to  the  principles  specified  for  documentaiy 
information in the Agreement, provided, however. that the recipient of  such undisclosed 
or other confidential or privileged information has been made aware in writing of the 
confidential character of the-infonnation communicated not-later than the time su~h a 
communication is made.  . 
C. Control 
Each Party shall endeavour to ensure that undisclosed information received by it un4er 
this Agre~ment shall be controlled as ·provided herein.  If  one of the Parties becomes . 
aware that it will  be, or may be- reasonably expected to  become, unable to meet the 
non-dissemination provisions of  paragraphs A and B above, it shall immediately inform 
the other PartY.  The Parties ~shall thereafter consult to define an appropriate.course of 
action. 
VI.  Dispute. Settlement and New types and Unforeseen Intellectual Property 
. 1.  Disputes between the Parties concerning intellectual property shaH  be resolved in 
accordance WithL'Ai-ticle i2  ofthis'Agr~ent. '  ·  L  ··:·· 
.  . 
2_  In the event .either Party or a  particip~t concludes that anew cype o( intellectual 
pr()perty not cov,er~d-in a..~  or.agreement betwee~  participants may result from 
a cooperative activity undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, or  if  other unforeseen 
difficulties arise, the ·Parties shall  en~r  into immediate discussions with the object 
of assuring that-the protection, exploitation and  dissemination of the  i~t~llectual 
·  · property in question are adequately' provided. for in their ·respective tenitories.  · E. C. Side Letter ·on  Issue of Export Licences 
Sir, 
I have the honour to refer to Article 4.2 of  the Agreement for co-op~ration in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear  en~·rgy between .the European  Atomic Energy Community and the United 
States of America. 
With regard  to the implementation of that Article it is my understanding that we have 
agreed  on  the following.  Authorisations,  including  export and  import licences as  well  as 
authorisations or consents to third parties· relating to trade, industrial  operations or nuclear 
material movements on the territories of  the Parties should generally be issu~  within a period 
of two months of  a submission to the relevant authority.  Nuclear trade between the European 
Community and the U.S. should be facilitated and encouraged;  it'is recognised that reliability 
. of supply is essential and that industry in the Community and in the U.S.A. needs continuing 
reassurance that deliveries can  be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation 
of nuclear installations;  it  is  further recognised  that undue delays in  the grant of export 
licences and other relevant authorisations including import licences would be inconsistent with 
the sound and efficient administration of this agreement. 
I wish to recall that, in accordance with Article 10 of the Agreement, the Parties will not 
interfere in the nuclear programmes.of each other,  they recognise that the European Union, 
its Member States and the U.S.A.  are equally strongly committed to  international nuclear 
non-proliferation and safeguards regimes . 
In the negotiation of the Agreement the Parties took  due note of  the undertakjngs wliich 
had been entered into in this field. 
The  Parties  express  their  full  confidence  in  each  other's  compliance  with  such 
undertakings. Accordingly the parties, in the grant of  licences for the export of  items pursuant 
to this agreement, will  refrain from  requiring  additional  confirmation from  the other party 
and  its  relevant  persons,  undertakings  or  authorities  about  full  compliance  with  these 
commitments. 
In  this  context,· it  is  'further  agreed  that  if the  relevant .authority  considers  that  an 
application  cannot be  processed  within  the .target two months period,  it  shall  immediately 
provide a reasoned information to the submitting persons or undertakings.  In the event of a 
refusal to authorise an  application or of a delay exceeding four months from the date of the 
first  application,  the Party of the submitting  persons  or undertakings  may  call  for  urgent 
consultations  under  Article  12  of the  Agreement  which  shall take  place  at  the  earliest 
opportunity, and  in any case not later than 30 days after such request. 
I would appreciate yo_ur  confirmatior;t that you share the understandings recorded in  this 
letter.  · 
Please accept,  Sir, etc. ., 
Note on Switzerland · 
.  . 
.·  • · · . · .I have .the honour tQ  r~fer to the Agreement for co-operation in· the peaceful uses • of 
. nuclear energy betWeen the European Atomic Energy Cc>1hmunity  and  the United· States of 
.America (hereinafter referred to as ''the U.S:IEuratom Agreement  .. ) and in particular to Article·. 
8.1 .. C (iii) of that J\greement.  .  . 
.  .  '  ·.  ,·  -
·I have the honour further to  confirm  that the United  States ~is negotiating  a  n·ew 
peaceful nuclear cO-operation agreement with the Swiss Federation; and thatthe United States 
.  is prepared  to offer long-term. prior  consent  to the Swiss  Federation for the trarisfer  o( 
irradiated nuclear  m~terial subjectto such an agreementinto Euratom for reproc.essing and 
for storage of  the re·covered plutonium and its fabrication into mixed oxide fuel elements. The 
United· States  is also  prepared,  in  connection  With  a  new  peaceful  nuclear· co-operation 
agreeme~t with the  Swiss Federation,  to offer  long~tenn, prior consent to Euratom to  the 
.  retransfer of Swiss phitoniuin, including such plutonium contained in MOX fuel  elements,. 
· Sllbject' to the U.S./Euratom  Agreement to Switzerland for use in  that ·country's -peaceful  . 
riuclear programme. .  ·  ·  , SIDE LEITER ON  SENSITIVE NUCLEAR 
TECHNOLOGY AND REACTOR TECHNOLOGY 
I  have the honor  ~o refer to the Agreement for· cooperation in the peaceful  uses of nuclear· 
energy betw~en the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America, 
signed  ·····  .  . 
Sensitive Nuclear Technology 
The Government of the Unite9  States notes  that the Agreement does  not  provide for  the 
,  transfer of sensitive nuclear technology or any component or group of components which are 
· essential to the operation of  a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel processing or heavy. 
water production  facility.  The Government of the United  States_ confirms to the European 
Community  that  sensitive  nuclear  technology,  defined  as  any- information  (including 
informatiQn incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part 
thereof)  which  is  not  available  to  the  public  and  which  is  important  to  the  design, · 
construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium· enrichment or nuclear fuel 
reprocessing  facility  or  a  facility  for  the  production ·of heavy  water,  but  not  including 
Restricted Data(l), may be transferred to the Community outside an agreement for co-operation. 
pursuant  to  sections  127  and  1i8 of the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Act).  The  transfer  of a 
reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water fa_cility  or a major critical component thereof may 
take place only pursuant to an agreement for co-operation. 
Reactor Technology 
The Government of  the United States further confirms that nuclear_ power reactor technology 
· may  b~ transferred to the Community outside an  agreement for co-operation. 
Non-nucl~ar material  other  than  the  one  defined  in  Articl.e  21.5  of the  Agreement,  e.g. 
zirconium  and_ its  alloys  and  compounds  may  be· transferred  froin  the  United  States  of 
America to  persons  and  undertakings  in  the  Community  outside  an  agreement  for  co-
operation. 
The  Government  of  the  United  ·states  notes  that  Sensitive· Technology  and  Reactor 
T~chnology may be. transferred from  the European Community to the United States outside 
_an  agreement for co-operation between them. 
The  Government  of the  United  States  avails  itself-of this  opportunity  to  renew  to  the 
European ·commission the assurance of its highest consideration. 
<I>Restricted  Data''  means  any  dat~ concerning  (1) ·design,  manufacture,  or  utilizatio~ of 
nuclear weapons, (2) the production of special fissionable material  or (3) the use of special_ 
fissionable material in the production of energy, but ddes not include data ofa Party which 
it has declassified or removed froni  the category of Restricted Data.  ·  -'-
/  -', 
Proposed reply to side letter on Sensitive Nuclear Technoloe;:V 
·  ·  and Reactor Tec.hnolou  · . 
Th-e Eumpean Commission· presents its compliments to the Mission of  the. U~ited States· ~f 
America to the European Unipn and has the honour'to ackowledge receipt of  the letter, dated 
·  .......  ~ .. .' .... , from the Mission concerning sensitive nuclear technology an~ reactor technology, 
a copy of  which is attached.  ·  ·  ·  - .  · 
The.Commission Wishes to inform the-Mission that it has taken due ~ote of  ~e· corltents of 
- this letter. 
The Commission avails its~lf of this opportunity to renew tot\le Mission of  the United States 
of America to the European Union the assurance of its highest consideration.  -.  -
\ 
:,. Declaration ·on  Non-Proliferation Policy 
1.  ·  On the occasion of  the signature of  the new Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy  between  the European Atomic Energy  Community  and  the 
United States of  America, the United States of  ~erica  and the European Union have 
decided to record the following  understapcllngs~ · 
2.  The United States and the European Union re-affirm their s~pport for strenithening. 
nuclear  non-proliferation  .measures . on  a  worldwide  basis; i  .their  commitiJlent 
increasingly to open  peaceful  nuclear trade and technology for states that abide by 
accepted  international  non-proliferation  rules;  and  their opposition  to controls that 
unfairly  burden  legitimate  commerce  and  unduly  restrain  worldwide  growth  and·. 
opportunity in the peaceful nuclear area. 
3.  The United States and the European Union are committed to  ensuring that research 
on, and develop111ent and use of,  nuclear energy .for peaceful purposes are carried out 
in  a· manner consistent with the objectives of the .Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons  ("the  Treaty"),· to  which the  United· States  of America  and  all 
Member. States of the Community  are parties.  They  affirm their intention to. work . 
closely together and with other interested states to  urg~ universal  adherence to the· · 
Treaty.  They  share the view that the Treaty is .the  cornerstone of the global  non-
proliferation regime,  and  that  an  effective non-proliferation regime is  necessary· to · 
achieve a full realizationofthe peaceful benefits of  nuclear energy and the objectives 
of Article  IV of the  Treaty.· They  further  share  the  view that  assurimce  of non-
proliferationhas an important bearing on assurarice of supply and that recognition of 
-this rehttionship has proved important in many deliberations on measures to facilitate 
. international nuclear trade. and co-operation. 
4.  The United  States of America and  the European Union consider that nuclear non-
proliferation policy,  as reflected in the Agreement,  fully meets U.S. and E.U. present · 
· and foreseeable  prol~feration concerns.  ' 
5.  ·Neither expects any  policy  changes ·or other circumstances-to take place that would 
adversely  affect the  terms. for  co-operation established by the Agreement including, 
in  particular,  those terms relating to agreement for certain activities to be carried out 
on ·an assured,  ~ecure and uninterrupted basis over the life of the Ag!eemeQt. 
6.  The United States and the European Union acknowledge that inclusion of reciprocal 
consent  provisions  fiJ  the  Agreement .  does  not reflect ?  lack  of confidence in  the 
· . nuclear non-:-proliferation credentials of either Party. 
7.  The United States furthermore confirms its readipess to  engage in negotiations with 
Eurato!ll pursuant to  paragraph 6 of Article 14  concerning elimination of provi'sions 
contained in  Article 8.2  of the Agreement,  in  so far as  improvements in  the global 
·non-proliferation enviro~ment lead. to changes in  the U  .. S.· position regarding-consent. 
. \  . 8.  ·.-The  U~ited· States and  the European  Union fully  support the  International  Atomic· 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  and  its  r_ole  in  reducing  the  risk  of ·proliferation.They· 
recognize the lA.EA's safeguards system ·_as  an essential element of the international 
non-proliferation regime. They have confidence in the IAEAsafeguards system, while 
recognizing the  need for the continuati-on  of-work on  improvement of  tha~ system 
·'  especially in countri_esofproliferation concern.· They share the view that n~n-nuclear . 
weapon states having nuclear facilities that are_ riot under IAEA safegilards should put. 
such facilities under IA.EA  safeguards, 'and that adherence to the Treaty is the best_· 
way to achieve this result.· 
.  .  . 
9.  The United States B4d the European Union are prepared to continue to take such steps 
as are necessary to allow the IA.EA to apply safeguards effectively and effiCiently arid 
to attain· its inspection .goals  at nuclear facilities in their respective jurisdictions in· 
accordance, respectively with the safeguards agreement between the Agency an_d  the 
United  States ofAmerica and the safeguards agreements between the Agency,  the  · 
>;-- •  Community and the Member States of the Community.  -- . 
10.  _The  United  States  further ·recognizes  that  p-ursuant  to  the ·Euratom  Treaty,  the 
_Community has to inake certain,  by appropriate supervision,  ·that nuclear materials 
are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended, and that to 
this end safeguards are  appli~d in accordance with Chapter VII of the EURATOM 
Treaty.  The_  United _States  and  the  European  Uni_on  share ·the -vie:w  that  the 
Community's regionat·safegtiards sys_tem makes an important and valuable contribution  _ 
to the achievement of non-proiiferation gocils and the above-mentioned objectives~ 
11  The United States of America, the Community, and all  its Member States recall that' 
they are parties to th-e International Gonvention_ofthe }>hysical Protection of  Nuclear 
Material,- the , provisions ·of which . are  importailt  to  the  prevention  of the  illidt 
·circulation of nuclear material. ·the United  States and the Merriber  States of the 
Community affirm their:_ intention to ensure application of  adeqti_ate physical protection ·-
to  the  use,  storage  and  transport  or' nuclear  material -within  their  respective 
jurisdictions. 
- -
12:·  Th_e  United States of  America and all  Member States of the Communi-ty  recall  that 
they adhere to the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers of the Nuclear Suppliers Group · 
(NSG). The UQited  States of America and-all Member States of the Community  that 
. presently -export  nuclear  c-ommodities  also  participate · in  the  NPT  Exporters 
Committee. The-United States and theEurope~n  Union re-affirm their shared viewthat 
the common  nuclear _non-proliferat~on export policies and. practices reflected  in.  the· 
NSG and the NPT Exporters Committee Guidelines play an essential role in ensuring 
that  peac~ful  nuclear  cooperation  is  carried ·out  under  appropriate-conditions 'and 
controls. The United States and the European Union stress in particular the importance 
of the NSG policy_ of  requiring IA.EA safeguards on all nuclear activities, .present an<!  . 
future,  as  a condition :for transfer to any  non-:nuclear  weapon-state of any _nuclear 
facilities,_~equipment, components or materials on the NSG trigger list ·and ·of the NSG 
arrangement for the control ofnuclear~related dual-use equipment, material and related  . -
technology.-They also reaffirm their intention to exercise caution ·and restraint in  the export  of sensitive  items  such  as  reprocessing  and  enrichment  equipment  _and 
technology,  recovered plutonium, and highly enriched uranium. 
13.  The United States and the European Union affirm their intention to co-operate with 
each· o.ther and with other interested states to urge all  nuClear suppliers to adhere to 
the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and otherwise to conduct nuclear export 
policies in  a manner that contributes to the prevention of nuClear proliferation. 
14.  The United States and the. European Union acknowledge that the separation, storage, 
tr~sportation, and use of plutonium call for the continuation of measures to ensure 
the avoidance of risk of nuclear proliferation;  they  are determined to continue to 
support  the  strengthening  of international  safeguards  and  other  non-proliferation 
measures. 
Signed at  on  1995 
· For the United States of America  for the European Union U.S.  Draft Side Letter · 
I have the honor to refer. to the Agreement for co-operation in the  peacef~l uses of . 
· nuclear energy  between. the  United .States  of America:  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Communi_ty .·signed  ,., ...  (hereinafter-referred  to  as  "the  Agreement"),  and  in  particular to 
. paragraph 2 of  Article 7 of  the Agreement, which provides that "Non-nuciear material, nuclear 
material and  equipment  transferred  pursuant  to  this  Agreement,  and  sp~cial  fissionable 
material_ used  in  or _produced  through the use of such  items  shall  not  be used  ...  fQr  any 
· military purpose."  .  · 
In consequence of  this provision, any U.S. nuclear co-operation with the Community 
or a Member State for military purposes would necessarily take place outside the scope of  the 
_Agreement and woull:f require a separate agreement-for co-operation specificatly intended to 
.  further  such  military. purposes.  I can  confirm  on  behalf of the· Government of the United 
States that such  nuclear co-operation  with  a  Memb~r State for -military  purposes will. be 
suitably considered· when circumstances so warrant · 
Signep at Washington on  1995.  . ' ISSN 0254-1475 
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